Yemen has become the testing ground for Saudi Arabia’s new assertive foreign policy and its bid for regional leadership. A Saudi-led coalition launched an aerial bombing campaign at the end of March to contain and reverse Houthi rebels’ expansion and reinstate exiled President Hadi.
The Saudi Kingdom was able to leverage shared concerns over the threat represented by Iran’s growing influence and backing of the Houthis to gain the support of other Sunni regimes in the region. However, Yemen represents little more than a backwater for many of the external actors involved. This is why Saudi Arabia, the country that has most invested in the crisis, may end up paying the highest political price for it.
The Yemen intervention epitomises the hawkish posture of the new generation of leaders who acceded to power following Saudi King Abdullah’s death in January 2015, in particular Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince and Defence Minister Mohammed bin Salman. Alongside a more muscular foreign policy, they are also keen to portray Saudi Arabia as a modern technocratic state that ensures order and stability. Therefore, the Saudis have justified their intervention as a response to an appeal for help by the legitimate government of Yemen.
But Saudi Arabia has over-reached. The coalition it has crafted is at best tenuous, presenting a common front against Iran but papering over major areas of disagreement. Turkey and Pakistan backtracked after initially signaling their willingness to participate. Egypt, despite significant financial inducements, has limited its contribution to a small naval presence as opposed to the ground troops coveted by Riyadh. Oman bowed out, Iraq is openly critical and Jordan is dissatisfied with the diversion of resources away from the fight against Daesh (or Islamic State).
There is no viable military strategy in place. While the coalition air force has destroyed the aerial and ballistic capabilities of the Houthis and their allies, the Saudis have been unable to force their retreat. There is no united front on the ground but rather a mix of Islamists, tribesmen, and southern separatists spurred on by financial inducements. Many of them are not even supportive of Hadi’s return. By mobilising local forces (popular committees), the Saudis are further contributing to the dismantling of formal state structures. Riyadh has also resorted to retraining Yemeni forces, while rumblings of a ground intervention continue.
There is no viable political strategy in place either. In fact, former United Nations (UN) chief envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, has stated that the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes have derailed efforts towards a power-sharing deal. Saudi Arabia has insisted that peace talks be held in Riyadh, rather than at a neutral venue. Consequently, the dialogue conference that started on May 17th in Riyadh does not include representatives from the Houthis or supporters of former President Saleh.
The intervention is turning into an image problem for Saudi Arabia. Cognisant of growing international concern, Riyadh paid 100 percent of a UN ‘flash appeal’ emergency fund, amounting to $274 million, and then doubled its contribution to $540 million. But the limited military objectives achieved have come at the expense of an acute humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA, as of May 6th 1,527 had died as a result of the conflict, at least 646 of them civilians. An embargo by the coalition is blocking deliveries of fuel, food, water and medicine, while humanitarian groups estimate the number of displaced people at almost 550,000. According to Human Rights Watch, the Saudi-led coalition has used cluster munitions supplied by the United States. Disorder has flamed sectarianism and opened up space for the expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The humanitarian crisis has increased pressure on Washington to push Riyadh towards a ceasefire. The United States (US) supported Saudi Arabia’s intervention because it would have been unable to stop it. It also wanted to prove to its Gulf allies that nuclear negotiations with Iran would not come at their expense; an effort which it reiterated at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at Camp David on March 14th, where it lent support to the Riyadh Conference under GCC auspices and committed to help GCC member states defend themselves against external threats emanating from Yemen. The US contributed intelligence, surveillance and re-supply of equipment and munitions, deployed aircraft carriers to the Arabian Sea and issued warnings to Iran not to get involved, all in an effort to reassure the Saudis. But the conflagration has exposed the US’ declining leverage in the region. The most Washington has been able to achieve has been Saudi acquiescence to a five-day humanitarian ceasefire, which broadly held between May 12th and 17th.
Paradoxically, Iran might end up being the one to gain the most. For Tehran, Yemen represents a low-risk, high-return proposition. Its interests in Yemen are not vital and any eventual political solution will have to incorporate the Houthis. Its support for the Houthis is an opportunistic attempt to expand its political influence rather than a strategic long-term investment (as opposed to its long-standing interests in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq). Foreign Minister Zarif has proposed a four-point plan to address the conflict, including a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance, a resumption of broad national dialogue and the establishment of an inclusive national unity government, which has not received much traction. However, Kerry has asked Iran to use its influence to get the Houthis to negotiate and the US has signalled its openness to potentially agree to Iran participating in negotiations.
The actions of the main external players involved in Yemen are tangential to the political struggle being waged within the country. For Saudi Arabia, it is about confronting Iran and stepping up to a coveted regional leadership role. For the US, it is about addressing its terrorism concerns and trying to balance its geopolitical game. For Iran, it is an opportunity to expand its political influence. Yemen is not a priority issue for any of these players, but some stand to lose more than others in this conflict.
Ana Echagüe is senior researcher at FRIDE.
Photo credits: Ibrahem_Qasim_CC_BY-S_4.0
